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Abstract 
The paper studies the co-evolution of industrial turbulence and financial volatility in the early 
phase of the life-cycle of an old high-tech industry and a new high-tech industry: the US auto 
industry from 1899-1929 and the US PC industry from 1974-2000.  In both industries, the first 
three decades were characterized by industrial turbulence: radical technological change, high 
entry and exit rates, and rapidly falling prices.  However, unlike in the auto industry, in the PC 
industry technological change and new entry did not lead to strong instability of market shares— 
at the core of the monopoly destroying effect of Schumpetarian creative destruction —until the 
1990’s when the lead of the incumbents from the pre-existing mainframe and minicomputer 
industries was undermined.  In both industries, stock prices were the most volatile and 
idiosyncratic during those years in which technological change disrupted market shares the most 
(Autos: 1918-1928, PCs: 1990-2000).  
 
Keywords: industry life-cycle, new economy, technological change, risk, stock price volatility.  
JEL Classification: L11 (Market Structure: Size Distributions of Firms), 030 (Technological 
Change), G12 (Asset Pricing). 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
*Comments and suggestions from Boyan Jovanovic, James Kahn, Steven Klepper, Jean Imbs, and Jack 
Triplett are much appreciated.  I also thank Denise Hawkes and Massimiliano Tancioni for excellent 
research assistance. The paper benefited from a grant by the Open University Research Development Fund 
(RDF Grant no. 793).  The usual disclaimer applies.  
 
Correspondence to: Economics Department, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 
6AA, U.K.,  Tel. + 44 -1908-654437, Fax. + 44 - 1908-654488, E-mail: m.mazzucato@open.ac.uk 
 
 1
I. Introduction 
 
While the concept of the “new economy” has inspired studies to compare the effect that 
new technologies have had on economy-wide productivity in previous eras with the effect 
that information technology (IT) has—or hasn’t yet—had in the current era, there has 
been much less attention devoted to whether industry-level dynamics have really 
changed.  That is, are the patterns that describe the evolution of new high-tech industries 
a result of something exciting behind the “new economy” or something more common 
behind the industry life-cycle? Or some of both?  
 
To investigate this question, the paper compares the co-evolution of industrial and 
financial dynamics in the early phase of the industry life-cycle of the US automobile 
industry (1899-1929), today a traditional industry that emerged with the second industrial 
revolution, with the early phase of the life-cycle of the US PC industry (1974-2000), a 
new high-tech industry that emerged with the third industrial revolution, often called the 
IT revolution or the New Economy.  The goal is to see whether patterns which are 
commonly associated with new high-tech industries, such as the importance of small 
innovative firms, turbulence in market shares, the increased role of expectations and 
stock price volatility, and the low correlation between earnings and market values, were 
just as common in the early phase of an industry which is today considered mature.   
 
To the extent that similarities between the two industries’ early stages are found, the 
much longer time series available for automobiles allows insights to be drawn on the 
patterns that might in the future characterize the mature phase of the PC industry.  
Furthermore, since the debate on economic growth in the new economy often centers 
around a comparison between the boom years of the 1920’s, which were based on the rise 
of the internal combustion engine, to the boom years of the 1990’s, which were based on 
the rise of information technology, a comparison of the industries which produced the 
products underlying these different eras shed light on which lessons from the 1920’s we 
can make use of today.    
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Section III (following a review of the data in Section II) uses the industry life-cycle 
framework (Gort and Klepper, 1982) to document the characteristics of instability and 
turbulence in the early evolution of the US automobile and PC industry.  In both 
industries, the first 30 years were characterized by a great deal of turbulence in the form 
of: radical technological change, high entry and exit rates, short firm life-spans, and a 
rapid fall in prices.  However, while in the auto industry these changes led straightaway 
to market share instability—at the core of the monopoly destroying effect of 
Schumpetarian creative destruction—in the PC industry, technological change and new 
entry did not upset the existing market structure until 1990 when the lead of the 
incumbents in the mainframe and minicomputer industry was destroyed.  And, in fact, it 
is this market share instability, caused by “competence-destroying” innovations, that 
provides the link between the industrial dynamics in Section III and the stock price 
dynamics in Section IV.   
 
Section IV studies the relationship between industrial turbulence and stock price 
volatility. How do the dynamics of high entry and exit rates and radical technological 
change affect the volatility of stock prices over time, the relationship between stock 
prices and the underlying fundamentals, and the relationship between firm and industry-
level stock returns and the market-level stock returns?  Results indicate that stock prices 
are most volatile during the decades in which market shares are the most unstable and 
technological change the most radical: 1918-1928 in the auto industry and 1990-2000 in 
the PC industry.  Furthermore, “idiosyncratic risk”, as measured through the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, is found to be higher in the early stage of industry evolution. 
 
The strong similarities between the early patterns of industrial turbulence and financial 
volatility in the two different industries—separated by almost 100 years— prompts the 
question: is it the economy that is new or the industries that are driving it?  
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II. Data  
The study focuses on the US market for automobiles and personal computers (including 
both domestic and foreign producers).  The firm-level and industry-level data is annual. 
Sales are measured in terms of annual units produced of automobiles (cars and trucks) 
and personal computers (all microcomputers, e.g. desktops and notebooks).  In both 
industries, units produced follow the same general qualitative dynamic as that of net sales 
in dollars but is preferred since sales figures are affected by different accounting 
procedures. 
 
Auto Industry: Individual firm units and total industry units from 1899-1999 come from 
annual editions of Wards Automotive Yearbooks .  Although firm-level units are collected 
here only for 10 domestic firms and 5 foreign firms (the first foreign firms entered in 
1965), the total industry sales include the units shipped by all existing firms (e.g. in 1909 
that includes the output of 271 firms).  Entry and exit figures from 1895-1965 come from 
Klepper and Simons (1997) using a list of producers found in Smith (1968)i.  Data used 
to calculate the frequency distribution of the length of life of the auto firms comes from 
Epstein (1926).  Hedonic prices and data on changes in quality are from the series used in 
Raff and Trajtenberg (1997).  Firm-level stock prices and dividends come from annual 
editions of Moody’s Industrial Manual.  Industry-level stock price and dividend indices 
are from the Standard and Poor’s Analyst Handbookii.  Since the S&P industry index for 
dividends only goes back to 1946, dividends for the pre-war period are aggregated from 
firm-specific data gathered from Moody’s Industrial Manualsiii.  
 
PC Industry:   Annual firm-level data on the total number of personal computers 
produced from 1973-2000 comes from the PC Database produced by the International 
Data Corporation (IDC).  From the firm-level units, the following variables are derived: 
annual number of entry and exits, the average life-span of individual firms, the total 
number of firms, and total industry sales. Entry and exits are calculated using the same 
methodology in Klepper and Simons (2000).  Firm-level stock price, dividend, and 
earnings per share data are from the Compustat database.  Industry-level financial 
variables are from the Standard and Poor’s Analyst’s Handbook (2000).  The firms which 
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define this index are all included in the firm-level analysis, except for Silicon Graphics 
and Sun Microsystems (the only two firms in the S&P computer index which don’t 
produce personal computers)iv.  Hedonic prices are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA).  Data on quality improvements are from Filson (2001).   
 
III. Industrial Instability 
This section looks at the early evolution of the US automobile and PC industry side by 
side to highlight the similarities and differences in their development.  The “early” phase 
in each industry is used here (and in the figures) to determine its “Age.”  This early phase 
includes the “introductory” phase in the industry life-cycle as well as the first half of the 
“growth” phase.  In the automobile industry the early phase, defining industry age, covers 
the period 1899-1929.  In the PC industry it covers the period 1974-2000.    
 
Studies on the industry life-cycle have documented the following empirical regularities:  
 
Introductory phase. At the beginning of an industry’s history there are many types of 
firms—the pioneers— with different efficiency levels and historical backgrounds.  The 
high technological opportunities in this phase cause the industry to be characterized by a 
lot of product innovation which results in many different versions of the product (Gort 
and Klepper, 1982).  The high rate of entry and the lack of product standardization cause 
industry concentration to be relatively low and market share instability to be high.  
 
Growth phase. The growth phase begins once there is relative convergence of production 
around a particular “standard” (Utterback and Suarez, 1993).  The market grows as 
consumers gain more knowledge about the product.  Economies of scale in production 
allow both costs and prices to fall. The fall in prices allows a wider group of consumers 
(the mass market) to purchase the goods so that it is no longer just a hobby or a luxury 
item.  Economies of scale and the consequent fall in profit margins contribute to the 
occurrence of an industry “shakeout”: only the largest most efficient firms are able to 
compete while many smaller and/or inefficient firms are forced to exit (Klepper, 1996).  
If early mover advantages exist, those firms that innovate first are most likely to survive 
the shakeout.  In fact, Klepper and Simons (1997) hold that the industry shakeout occurs 
not due to the advent of a dominant design (as suggested in Utterback and Suarez, 1993 
and Jovanovic and Macdonald, 1994) but due to increasing returns in the innovation 
process. 
 
Mature phase. The mature phase is one in which the opportunities for product innovation 
are low.  Demand is centered on direct and indirect replacement.  Firm strategies are 
focused on price competition, advertising and process innovation. Price wars create 
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further barriers to entry for smaller firms.  Market shares in this phase tend to be more 
stable and concentration higher. 
 
In both the automobile and the PC industry, the introductory period occurred after an 
initial period in which the product was produced more by hobbyists than by commercial 
manufacturers.  Early versions of the products emerged from experiments carried out by 
“tinkerers” in their homes or workshops/garages.  The introductory period in the auto 
industry, when production began to be for commercial purpose only, began in 1899.  
Prior to this period, the auto industry was not even listed in the census of manufacturers 
under a separate heading–by 1926 it had already attained an equal importance to 
shipbuilding and railroads (Epstein, 1928, p. 30).   In the period running from 1899-1923, 
the industry experienced a large surge in entry of new firms that sought to take advantage 
of the new profit opportunities.  Many of these firms failed.  In 1901 Oldsmobile 
produced the world’s first mass produced automobile and in 1910 Ford used the 
industry’s first branch assembly plant to produce the first standardized car in the industry, 
the Model T.  Product standardization introduced economies of scale, which allowed 
costs and prices to fall.  By 1923, 50% of US households owned an automobile.  
 
The first 5-8 years of the PC industry (1974-1981) were also very experimental and run 
mainly by hobbyist firms.  Entry was determined primarily by technological innovation 
and by system-compatible software (Stavins, 1995). The first mass produced 
minicomputer, the Altair 8800, was introduced by Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry 
Systems (MITS) in 1974.  Until 1981, the different PC firms such as MITS, IMSAI, 
Apple, Commodore and Tandy each used their own platform: no single firm controlled 
the interface standards, the operating system or the hardware architecture.  Real 
commercial growth began after IBM introduced the IBM PC in 1981.  This initiated the 
phase of IBM “compatibility” in both hardware and software, whereby almost all firms 
used the IBM platform.  Product standardization allowed economies of scale, costs and 
prices to fall and demand to increase.  Three further developments markedly increased 
the growth of the PC industry: (1) Intel’s introduction of the 32-bit 386 processor in 1985 
which allowed graphical interface and hence a more user-friendly environment, (2) the 
introduction of Windows 3.0 in 1990, which standardized the PC on the Windows 
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operating systems platform –allowing “cloning” of the IBM PC (based on its open-
standards architecture), and (3) the commercial rise of the world wide web in the 1990’s.  
All three developments contributed to the rapid increase in sales and later to the rapid fall 
in prices.  As in the auto industry, after only two decades of industry evolution, 50% of 
US households in 1999 owned a personal computer.    
 
Entry and exit  
Figure 1 illustrates the remarkable similarity between the auto industry and the PC 
industry during their first 27 of development: in both cases the industry went from 
infancy to just below 300 firms in about 12 years (271 auto firms in 1909 and 286 PC 
firms in 1987).  In both cases, the industry “shakeout” began about 15 years after the 
initial growth spurt: around 1910 in the auto industry and around 1989 in the PC 
industryv.  In automobiles, by 1940 there were only a dozen firms left, a phenomena that 
is currently happening in the PC industry where just 5 firms share almost 50% of the 
global marketvi. 
 
FIGURE 1  
 
Figures 2-3 illustrate the churning of entry and exit underlying the changes in firm 
numbers.  In both cases, entry and exit are often inversely correlated which suggests that 
firms choose good years to enter and bad years to exit.  As in Jovanovic (1982), entry 
appears to lead exit.  Due to the high level of vertical disintegration in the industry, entry 
rates in the PC industry lasted a little longer than in the auto industry. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
An important difference between the two industries, which greatly affected the relative 
power of the new entrants, is that whereas the PC industry emerged from a pre-existing 
market for mainframe computers and minicomputers, the auto industry did not emerge 
from a pre-existing industry.  The fact that de novo entrants in the PC industry had to 
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compete with incumbents like IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation and Hewlett-
Packard, meant that new entrants would not reveal their weight until radical innovations 
in the industry undermined the lead of the incumbents.  Although some background 
experience in the production of related products like engines, bicycles, carriages and 
wagons, was no doubt helpful to the new firms entering the auto industry, this is not 
comparable to the advantages that firms with experience in the production of mainframe 
and minicomputers had in the production of PCsvii.  Hence, while in the auto industry 
new entry led to an immediate and turbulent shuffling for market positions, in the PC 
industry new entry did not seriously upset industry structure until a decade and a half 
later.  
 
Live fast - die young 
Table 1 reveals that the business failure rate during the first three decades of both 
industries was much higher than the average failure rate in the economy at large  
during those same periods. 
TABLE 1 
 
The high risk and uncertainty faced by firms in this early period is also highlighted by 
their very short life spans.  Figure 4 depicts the frequency distribution of the length of life 
of firms in the two industries.  In both cases, as the length of (firm) life increases, the 
number of surviving firms decreases.  Fifty percent of the total number of firms in both 
industries lasted about 5 years—with many not even making it to their first yearviii.  
 
FIGURE 4 
 
By 1926 only 33% of the firms that began producing automobiles during the previous 22 
years had survived. By 1999 only 20% of the firms that began producing PCs in the 
previous 22 years had survived.  What caused this industry “shakeout”?    
 
Technological Change and Falling Prices  
In both industries, the industry “shake-out” was a result of the combined dynamics of 
technological change and falling prices.  In a paragraph that could easily describe IT 
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based industries today, Epstein (1927) describes the process of creative destruction in the 
early auto industry as follows:  
“One would expect the hazards to be greater in a new industry, especially one making a complex 
fabricated product, subject to constant change and improvement in design and construction. This 
recurrent necessity of making innovations both in the character of the product and in methods of 
manufacture, if a firm’s place in the industry is to be maintained, probably serves to explain in 
large measure the complete disappearance of many automotive names that were highly respected.”  
(Epstein, 1927, p. 161).  
 
In line with industry life-cycle theory, the shakeout in both industries occurred shortly 
after the emergence of a dominant design which could be mass-produced.  In the auto 
industry, the greatest exits occurred  between 1907-1912, which coincides with the 
advent of the Model T that introduced mass production techniques to the industry. In the 
PC industry, most of the exits occurred between 1987-1993, coinciding with two 
developments which allowed the production of PCs to be standardized and 
“commoditized”: Intel introduction of the 32-bit 386 processor in 1985 and Microsoft’s 
introduction of Windows 3.0 in 1990.  
 
In the auto industry, the extraordinarily high exit rate in 1910 was due to the large fall in 
demand for high-priced cars that occurred in that year and the fact that those firms not 
able to adapt to the new cheaper cars (lighter-weight, four cylinder vehicles) were forced 
to exit (Epstein, 1926). Ford’s Model T was the embodiment of the lighter car that could 
be sold for cheaper.  The fall in exit rates after 1912 was due to the growth of the 
industry, which facilitated the purchase, and use of standardized parts.  For example, 
between 1905 and 1923 sixteen standardized parts replaced 800 different sizes of lock 
washers, and less than fifty alloy steels replaced 1600 different types of steel being used 
(Epstein,1927, p.170).   
 
In both industries, the main effect of economies of scale was to allow costs and prices to 
radically fall. Between 1906 and 1940 the inflation adjusted prices of automobiles 
dropped almost 70% (Raff and Trajtenberg, 1997, p. 77).  Figure 5 illustrates the fall in 
auto prices using the hedonic price index created by Raff and Trajtenberg (1997).  Most 
of the real change in automobile prices that occurred between 1906-1982 was 
concentrated in the period 1906-1940.  Within that period most of the change occurred 
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between 1906-1918.  Between 1906-1940 hedonic prices fell at an average annual rate of 
5%.   Figure 5 illustrates that while in the auto industry prices fell most rapidly in the first 
decade of its evolution, in the PC industry prices fell most rapidly during the third decade 
of its evolution.  Hedonic PC prices fell by an average of 18% between 1983-89, an 
average of 32% between 1989-94, and an average of 40% between 1994 and 1999 
(Berndt and Rappaport, 2000).  This faster fall of prices in the 1990’s coincided with the 
replacement of the IBM OS/2 platform with the Wintel platform—ending the period of 
IBM compatibility which had until then constrained the depth and breadth of the 
innovation process. In the 1990’s, the commercial rise of the Internet also contributed to 
the increased sales and fall in prices of PCs.    
 
FIGURE 5 
 
In both industries, falling prices reflect the radical changes in technology, the diffusion of 
mass production, and the general expansion of the market.  Different studies on 
technological change in the auto industry have emphasized that the most radical 
innovations in the auto industry occurred in the very early years.  For example, firm-level 
data on process and product innovations in the auto industry from 1890-1980, reveal that 
those innovations that affected the production process the most occurred prior to 1940 
(Abernathy et al. 1993).  Furthermore, Filson (2001) finds that most quality 
improvements in the auto industry occurred in the early phase of the auto industry’s life-
cycle—with innovation dying down significantly towards the end of the growth phase.  
His quality change index is computed by dividing actual BEA price ratios by quality 
adjusted price ratios (the latter computed by Raff and Trajtenberg, 1997).   Figure 6 
displays his results.  Dividing the early stage of the industry into three different periods, 
he finds that the first decade witnessed the highest percentage of quality change: 25% 
between 1895-1908, 3.1% between 1909-1922 and 3.2% between 1923-1929.    
 
FIGURE 6 
 
The differences between the two industries in terms of when prices fell the quickest 
reflect the differences in terms of when quality changed the most. Unlike in the auto 
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industry where most of the price and quality change occurred in the first decade, in the 
PC industry most of the price and quality change occurred in the third decade of its 
evolution: 34% quality change between 1975-1986, 17% between 1987-1992 and 38% in 
the period 1993-1999 (Filson, 2001).  Bresnahan (1998) attributes the higher degree of 
competitive innovation in the last decade to the “vertically disintegrated” structure of 
innovation in that period: innovation has been spread out between the makers of the PCs 
(e.g. Dell), the makers of microprocessors (e.g. Intel), the makers of the operating 
systems (e.g. Microsoft), and the makers of application software (e.g. Lotus).  
 
Changes in industry structure: market share instability and concentration 
In both industries, those periods in which there was the most radical innovation were also 
those periods in which market shares were the most unstable.  This is because 
technological change has the most effect on market structure when innovations are 
competence destroying ones, i.e. ones that render the competencies of the incumbents 
obsolete (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). The ability of technological change to destroy 
monopoly rents is, in fact, the essence of Schumpetarian “creative destruction.”  From 
1980-1990, innovation in the PC industry was more of the competence-enhancing type: it 
served to enhance the existing competencies and lead of IBM.  From 1990-2000, 
innovation in the PC industry was more of the “competence-destroying” type: new 
innovations destroyed the lead of IBM.  
 
This process of creative destruction is captured here through an instability index, I, which 
tracks absolute changes in market shares: 
|][| 1,
1
−
=
−= ∑ tin
i
it ssI                (1) 
where  its = the market share of firm i at time t (Hymer and Pashigian, 1962).  The larger 
the value of I, the riskier the environment for any given firm: current growth is not a 
guarantee of future growth.  To prevent the changing number of firms to affect this index, 
I is calculated here using only the market shares of the top 10 firms in each industryix.  In 
the auto industry, these are: Ford, GM, Chrysler, Studebaker, Packard, Hudson, Nash, 
Willys, Kaiser and American Motors.  In the PC industry, these are: IBM, NCR, Apple, 
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Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, Dell, Gateway, Toshiba, Wang, and Unisys (different 
compositions of firms were experimented with to ensure that I is not sensitive to the 
particular firms included in the calculation). Table 2, which contains the average value of 
I during different decades (and also the volatility of stock prices to be compared with I in 
Section IV), indicates that the levels of market share instability in the two industries were 
very similar during their early phases.  
 
 
Table 2 and Figure 7 indicate that in the auto industry market share instability was 
highest during the period 1900-1928, with most of the action occurring between 1918-
1928.  This latter period was particularly unstable since it includes the years when GM 
began challenged Ford as the industry leader (achieved in 1927).  The period of highest 
market share instability was also the period in which sales were the most volatile—
although the average growth rate of sales was higher in the previous decade when the 
industry was first taking off.  From 1940 onwards, market share instability steadily 
decreased as did also innovation and entry.  Market share instability increased in the 
1970s, when foreign firms entered the US auto market, but the level was still much lower 
than that experienced during the industry’s early stage.  
 
In the PC industry, market share instability rose with the entry of new firms in the 1980’s, 
but became especially high in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when IBM lost control of 
the innovation process, allowing the new firms (that had entered earlier)  to gain more 
market share and to have a greater influence over the innovation process.  Table 2 
indicates that although PC sales were the most volatile in the first decade of industry 
evolution, market share instability was highest in the decade 1990-2000.  The fact that 
market shares in both industries were the most unstable in periods of competence-
destroying innovations, not necessarily during the very early period of growth, indicates 
that market share instability is indeed a result of Schumpeterian creative destruction.  
 
FIGURE 7 
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How does market instability affect the level of inequality between firms, i.e. market 
concentration?  Figure 8 indicates that in periods of high market share instability 
concentration tends to be low, and vice versa.  In the US auto industry, concentration was 
initially low— since all firms were de novo entrants— and then increased during and 
after the shakeout period. The strong economies of scale that developed in the 1920’s, 
and the associated fall in price-cost margins, caused the industry to become increasingly 
concentrated.  Concentration stopped increasing in the 1970’s when the entry of foreign 
firms in the US market stimulated more competition.    
 
In the PC industry, concentration instead began high due to the power of the pre-existing 
incumbents and then decreased when that power was challenged in the 1990’s.  Vertical 
disintegration in the 1990’s allowed the co-existence of different firms and kept the level 
of concentration relatively low.  However, the severe slowdown of industry growth in the 
last 2-3 years has stimulated fierce price wars (led by Dell), turning attention away from 
innovation towards more zero-sum type strategies which have begun to increase 
concentration.  Industry analysts have warned that if this continues, the industry might 
soon be composed of only 2-3 giant firms—not dissimilar to the auto industryx. 
 
FIGURE 8 
  
The future: S-shaped market growth?  
Figure 9 compares the early years of market growth in the auto industry with that in the 
PC industry and finds a strikingly similar picture: sales (units) growth increased at a 
similar rate and it took exactly 24 years for 50% of US households to own the product: in 
1923, 50% of US households owned a car, and in 1998 50% of US households owned a 
PC.  Figure 10 illustrates what happened in the auto industry after the early stage that has 
been the focus until now.  The familiar S shaped pattern indicates that fast early growth 
was followed by (permanent) stagnation around the beginning of the 1960’s.  Is this the 
future of the PC industry?  In 2000 and 2001, sales for PCs have fallen for the first time 
since 1985xi.  However, just as the rise of the interstate highway prolonged the growth 
phase of the US auto industry, and just as the rise of the internet gave a new impetus to 
the PC industry in the early 1990’s, new potential developments in the PC industry—such 
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as real-time communications, note taking and music storage systems—could allow the 
growth phase to persist for some more decades.   
 
FIGURE 9 
   
  FIGURE 10 
 
IV. Stock Price Volatility 
The relationship between industrial instability, as described above, and stock price 
volatility is determined by the effect of uncertainty on stock prices.  In a period of high 
market share instability, current performance is not a good indicator of future 
performance.  Hence, it is especially in such unstable periods that investors will be more 
likely to be influenced by the speculation of other investors, leading to herd effects and 
the type of over-reactions emphasized by Campbell and Shiller (1988) in their analysis of 
excess volatility.  Furthermore, the constant corrections that investors must make to their 
previous predictions in this turbulent period should also increase stock price volatility.  
Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) find support for this hypothesis in the US auto industry: 
“excess volatility” was higher in the early phase of the life-cycle when market share 
instability was highest.    
 
To trace the co-evolution of industrial instability and stock price volatility, three different 
snapshots of stock price volatility are used. 
 
1. Volatility of actual stock prices vs. volatility of perfect foresight prices 
First, the volatility of the average industry stock price in each industry (the industry index 
calculated by S&P) is compared with the volatility of the market value that emerges from 
the perfect foresight or efficient market model (from now on the EMM price). The EMM 
price is used solely as a benchmark.  A constant discount rate is used instead of a time-
varying one, so that one can clearly observe the movement in the discount rate—the risk 
premium—that would be needed to allow the perfect foresight model to better track the 
movements in the actual stock prices?  If this movement is supported by the depiction, in 
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Section III, of how industrial uncertainty evolves over time, then a connection clearly 
exists between industrial instability and stock price volatility.     
 
The efficient market model (EMM) states that the real stock price is equal to the expected 
value of discounted future dividends: 
  *ttt vEv =           (2) 
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* γ         (3) 
where *tv is the ex-post rational or perfect-foresight price, ktD + is the dividend stream, 
jt+γ is a real discount factor equal to )1/(1 jtr ++ , and jtr + is the short (one-period) rate of 
discount at time t+j.   
 
The perfect foresight price *tv  is computed here for the two industries, using the industry 
level stock price and dividend (both indices computed by S&P).  After dividing the 
industry level data by the S&P 500 equivalent (e.g. automobile dividend / S&P 500 
dividend), and detrending the data to ensure stationarity, *tv  is calculated recursively 
using Equation (4): 
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for which the moving average version is: 
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where ATv is the actual price at the terminal date T (the subscripts for firm i and industry j 
are not included).  Given the lag in Eq. (4), it is not possible to calculate *tv  at T.  Instead, 
if T=100, the value for *tv at t = 99 is calculated by using tv at T in place of 1+tv in Eq. 
(4). Then for each other value from t = 1 to t = 98, Eq. (4) is used.    
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Figures 11 and 12 compare the volatility of *tv  and tv in the auto industry and the PC 
industry.  The standard deviations of both series are taken during a 10-year interval, 
meaning that the last 10 years cannot be looked at if the interval begins at t=1.  In the PC 
industry, the results are tested for their sensitivity to beginning the interval at t=1 or at 
t=T.  Since the qualitative results are not affected (volatility is highest in the last decade), 
Figure 12 depicts the results from the method starting at t=-T so that the dynamics in the 
last 10 years, which exhibit the most industrial turbulence, can be more clearly observed.  
In the auto industry the interval begins at t=1 so that the years of industrial turbulence can 
be focussed on (again, the qualitative dynamics are found to be insensitive to this 
procedure).  
 
Automobiles. Figure 11 illustrates that from 1918 to the early 1930’s, the volatility of the 
actual stock price in the auto industry was always greater than that which would have 
been predicted by the perfect foresight model.  However, the difference between the 
actual and predicted series fell at the end of the 1920’s and in the 1930’s—precisely when 
the industry began to stabilize in terms of market shares, entry and exit rates, innovation, 
and prices.  The difference in the volatility of the two series would be much smaller—
hence excess volatility lower— if Equation (4) embodied a time-varying discount rate tr  
that was both higher and more volatile in the period 1918-1930.  This would imply that 
risk was higher and more variable in that period – exactly what the patterns of industrial 
turbulence and uncertainty suggest.       
 
Personal computers. Figure12 compares the volatility of *tv  and tv in the PC industry. 
The volatility of the actual stock price is, again, higher than the volatility of the EMM 
price.  Until 1990 the difference in volatility of the two series is more or less constant 
until 1990. The relative volatility of the actual stock price increases.  Excess volatility 
would be much lower if Equation (4) embodied a time-varying discount rate tr  that was 
both higher and more volatile in the period from 1990-2000—again, exactly what the 
patterns of industrial turbulence and uncertainty in Section III suggest. 
            FIGURE 11 
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FIGURE 12 
 
The results suggest that the dynamics of financial risk are related to the industry-specific 
dynamics of creative destruction. 
 
2. Volatility of stock prices versus volatility of units and market shares 
The relationship between industrial instability and stock price volatility can be most 
clearly observed by comparing the standard deviation of the growth rate of stock prices to 
the standard deviation of the growth rate of units and to the level of market share 
instability (I).  Table 2 displays the results for the industry level data, while results for 
firm-level data can be found in Mazzucato (2001).  The analysis of the auto industry is 
limited here to that period in which the auto firms were listed on the stock market, i.e. 
from 1918 onwards (although some data on units and market shares is also provided for 
the previous years for reference only). 
 
TABLE 2 
   
Table 2 confirms the result found above: stock prices in each industry were most volatile 
during the same period during which market shares were most unstable: 1918-1928 in the 
auto industry and 1990-2000 in the PC industry.  Most of the volatility in the PC industry 
occurred in the sub-period 1994-2000—precisely the years commonly used to date the 
New Economy.  While in the automobile industry this was also the period in which units 
were most volatile, in the PC industry units were instead most volatile in the first decade 
(1970-1980).  The fact that stock price volatility follows market share instability more 
than sales volatility suggests that stock price volatility reacts to uncertainty in relative 
growth rates (i.e. market shares) more than to uncertainty in absolute growth rates.    
 
The last column in Table 2, which displays the volatility of the series after they are 
divided by their S&P 500 equivalents, indicates that stock price volatility is indeed 
caused by industry-specific factors not economy-wide factors.  A comparison with the S-
shaped pattern of market growth in Figure 10 indicates that relative stock prices fell in the 
early 1960s precisely when industry sales fell.    
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The average stock price in the computer industry fell relative to that of the general market 
beginning in the 1980’s, shortly after the advent of the IBM PC.  Table 2 indicates that it 
began to rise again only in 1993: 1994-2000 is the only period in which there is a positive 
average growth rate for the relative computer stock.  The late rise may be due to the fact 
that the firms that innovated the most in the industry did not enter until relatively late and 
did not get listed on the stock market until even later –for example, Compaq was first 
quoted in 1988, Dell in 1996, and Gateway in 1996.  IBM has, instead, been included in 
the S&P computer stock index since 1918.  Some large firms like NCR were removed by 
S&P from the index before the relative rise: NCR was removed in 1991, Xerox in 1987, 
and Wang in 1992.  Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) claim that the computer stock fell 
relative to the S&P500 in the 1980’s because the computer firms that were quoted on the 
market at that time were the incumbents whose capabilities and competencies would be 
made obsolete by the radical innovations in the 1990’s.  
 
3.  Industry age and co-movement with the general market  
How does idiosyncratic risk evolve over the industry life-cycle?  The capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) measures idiosyncratic risk through the covariance between the firm-
level (or industry-level) stock return and the market-level stock return: the lower is this 
covariance the higher is the unsystematic or idiosyncratic level of risk. Unsystematic risk 
in an industry might be higher in early periods of growth since idiosyncratic factors 
affecting both supply and demand are stronger in this phase: consumers’ tastes for the 
new product are still adjusting and the product has yet to settle around a standardized 
version, often undergoing hundreds of model changes.  In fact, Campbell et al. (2000) 
claim that individual stock returns have become more volatile since the 1960’s because 
companies have begun to issue stock earlier in their life-cycle when there is more 
uncertainty about future profits.  This is similar to the finding in Morck et al. (1999) that 
volatility is higher in emerging markets due the effect of undeveloped institutional 
structures on the uncertainty about future profits. However, it is also possible that in 
periods of uncertainty, an industry is less settled and hence more vulnerable to economy-
wide shocks—which would imply higher covariance between industry-specific returns 
and the market return in the early phase.  
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To observe the changing level of firm and industry-specific risk in the two industries, a 
cointegration test is used to see to what degree the movements in firm and industry stock 
returns are correlated with movements in the market level stock return (S&P500).  A 
stock’s return is defined as: 
1P
DP
r
1t
tt
t −
+=
−
         (6) 
where Pt and Dt are the stock price and dividend (in logs) at time t.  To test for 
cointegration, the two stage Engle and Granger (1997) test is used, based on an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration (CRADF)xii.    
 
TABLE 3 
 
Automobiles.  Cointegration tests were conducted only on the returns of those firms that 
were available for most of the sample: GM, Ford, Chrysler, Studebaker and American 
Motors. The results for the firm-level returns were qualitatively the same as that for the 
industry level return—not surprising given that these same firms were used by S&P to 
calculate the average industry index. Table 3 displays the results for the average industry 
return, while firm-level results are available in Mazzucato (2001).  The first part of Table 
3 indicates that the auto industry return cointegrates with the S&P500 return only after 
1956: after 1956 the CRADF value in Table 3 is larger than the 95% critical value and the 
residual of the data generating process (Res. DGP in Table 3) is integrated of the order 0 
(I(0)).  Before the 1950’s, the individual stock returns did not cointegrate with the market 
return.  This means that in this earlier period, which coincides with the “introductory” 
phase of the industry life-cycle and the end of the “growth” phase, firm-level and 
industry-level returns were determined by idiosyncratic factors specific to the auto 
industry.  The result is confirmed by the relatively high standard error of the residual in 
the pre-war period (SER in Table 3). The negative coefficient on the Trend variable in 
Table 3 indicates that the industry return declined over time with respect to the average 
market return—a fact that is confirmed in Figure 13.  
  
The second part of Table 3 contains the results from the error correction representation of 
the cointegration regression. Since the coefficient on the value of the lagged residual is 
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significant and negative, this means that the long run cointegration relationship is strong.  
The recursive coefficients for the error correction model solutions display the short-run 
solution of the long-run relations from the Engle and Granger two stage analysis. Plots of 
these coefficients confirm that the industry cointegrated with the general market around 
1956.  Firm-level coefficients for GM, Chrysler and Ford indicate the same date, while 
American Motors cointegrated later, most likely because it entered the industry much 
later.  A comparison of these results with Figure 10, reveals that cointegration with the 
general market occurred exactly when the growth of the auto industry began to 
permanently slow down, i.e. when it reached the plateau on the S-shaped growth curve.  
 
Personal Computers. Table 4 indicates that in the PC industry, the industry return never 
cointegrated with the market return: the CRADF value is always lower than the 95% 
critical value.  Hence, returns in the PC industry are still idiosyncratic--as they were 
during the first 30 years of the auto industry.   If/when growth in the PC industry reaches 
a similar plateau to that experienced in the auto industry in 1960, the level of 
idiosyncratic risk may fall.    
 
TABLE 4 
 
Thus, preliminary analysis suggests that firm and industry-specific returns are correlated 
with the market return only once the industry in question has entered its mature stage, i.e. 
when growth begins to stagnate.  Prior to that, firm-specific and industry-specific returns 
are determined by idiosyncratic factors , such as consumers’ discovery if they like the 
product, uncertainty over what standard to adopt, high business failure rates, and the size 
of the market.  Thus, idiosyncratic risk should be looked at over the course of industry 
evolution, not in selected time frames, since the latter will coincide with the early stage in 
some industries and the mature stage in others.  For example, Campbell et al. (2000) find 
that since the 1960’s idiosyncratic risk in many industries, including the auto industry, 
has increased and conclude from this that economy-wide changes have taken place, most 
likely related to the emergence of IT.  However, a study of the entire history of the 
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industry reveals that idiosyncratic risk in the post-1960 period is lower than that which 
existed prior to 1940—making it harder of course to argue that a new era has begun. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The present study has compared the co-evolution of industrial and financial dynamics 
during the early development of an old high-tech industry and a new high-tech industry: 
the US auto industry from 1899-1929 and the US PC industry from 1974-2000.  On the 
industrial side, both industries experienced a high degree of turbulence during the first 30 
years: high entry and exit rates, short firm life-spans, radical innovation, and rapidly 
falling prices.  On the financial side, both industries experienced the most stock price 
volatility during those periods in which the forces of creative destruction were the 
strongest.  While in the auto industry this occurred straightaway, in the PC industry, it 
took a longer time because the innovation process was for the first decade and a half 
dominated by the incumbents from the pre-existing mainframe and minicomputer 
industries.     
 
Different provocative lessons emerge from the study.  First, the fact that those 
characteristics often used to describe new economy industries—innovative, 
entrepreneurial, dynamic, unstable, speculative—depict just as well the early 
development of an industry which is today considered old and sluggish, suggests that 
perhaps it is not the economy that is “new” but the industries that are driving its growth.  
Second, changes in the relative growth rates of firms lie at the heart of economic growth 
more so than changes in absolute growth rates—a claim long argued by evolutionary 
economists (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Third, financial risk is related to the industry-
specific dynamics of creative destruction.  It is this feedback between risk and strategic 
innovation that led the pioneer of the study of risk to state:  “Without uncertainty it is 
doubtful whether intelligence itself would exist.” (Knight,1921, p. 268).    
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
Length of Life of 180 Auto Firms (1895-1924) and 668 PC Firms (1970-2000)
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Figure 5 
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Hedonic Prices and Industry Age
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
 
 
       Figure 10  
 
S-Shaped Market Growth in the Auto Industry 
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Standard Deviation of Actual Stock Price and EMM Price in the Auto Industry
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Table 1 
 
Aggregate Business Failure Rate (%) vs. Failure Rate in Autos and PCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economy Auto Economy PC
1903 0.9 4 1984 0.9 3.4
1904 0.9 3 1985 1.0 7.7
1905 0.8 5 1986 1.1 14.0
1906 0.7 2 1987 1.0 8.7
1907 0.8 0 1988 0.9 18.4
1908 1.1 4 1989 0.8 15.7
1909 0.8 1 1990 1.0 13.3
1910 0.8 26 1991 1.4 14.2
1911 0.8 4 1992 1.5 20.4
1912 0.9 12 1993 1.3 15.4
1913 0.9 10 1994 1.1 88.2
1914 1.0 9 1995 1.1 50.5
1915 1.0 7 1996 1.1 21.7
1916 1.0 9 1997 1.2 12.7
1917 0.8 7 1998 na 9.3
1918 0.6 7 1999 na 5.6
1919 0.4 5 2000 na 12.2
1920 0.5 6
1921 1.0 1
1922 1.2 10
1923 1.0 15
1924 1.0 19
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Table 2 
 
Volatility of Market Shares, Units and Stock Prices 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   MS Inst.     Units    Stock Stck/SP500
AUTO
1908-1918 16.3 0.1273
0.1356
1918-1928 22.6 0.1569 0.1458 0.1257
0.0304 0.0939 0.0617
1918-1941 17.9 0.1500 0.1393 0.1089
0.0378 0.0620 0.0352
1948-2000 7.6 0.0638 0.0791 0.0352
0.0070 0.0298 -0.0020
1948-1970 10.3 0.0759 0.0671 0.0372
0.0171 0.0335 0.0002
1970-2000 5.6 0.0523 0.0881 0.0335
-0.0030 0.0243 -0.0036
PC
1970-1980 1.4 0.2062 0.0708 0.0294
0.2431 -0.0047 -0.0039
1980-1990 11.5 0.1884 0.0662 0.0324
0.1450 0.0154 -0.0136
1990-2000 17.9 0.0357 0.1196 0.0445
0.0646 0.0585 -0.0003
1994-2000 20.1 0.0217 0.2887 0.5990
0.0679 0.041 0.0162
1970-2000 10.3 0.1758 0.0905 0.0349
0.1504 0.0258 -0.0038
all variables are in logs and differenced 
italics=mean value under the standard deviation
bold number=decade with highest value
MS Inst.= average instability index from Eq. (1)
Units=standard deviation and mean of units produced
Stock=standard deviation and mean of industry-level stock price
Stck/SP500= industry-level stock price divided by S&P500 stock price 
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Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression in the levels of the variables and residuals cointegration tests (Auto industry)
Dep var. Sample Intercept MKT return trend S.E. of R. CRADF CRADF order 95% crit. val Res. DGP
IND return 1919-98 1.5801 0.0911 -0.00462 0.18933 -3.7088 3 -3.9092 I(1)
IND return 1919-41 0.7936 1.4532 -0.02531 0.20778 -2.2102 4 -4.3508 I(1)
IND return 1948-98 0.9266 0.9722 -0.01419 0.08935 -2.8878 0 -4.0542 I(1)
IND return 1956-98 0.9216 0.4039 -0.00314 0.06811 -4.1512 1 -4.1366 I(0)
IND return 1956-98 0.9544 0.2229 - 0.06843 -4.5819 1 -3.5622 I(0)
Error-Correction Model representation for the cointegration regression (Auto industry) 
Coefficients: Diagnostics:
Dep var. Sample Intercept dMKT return res(-1) Rbar-sq F-stat D-W LMA LMN
dlND return 1957-98 -0.0053 0.5764 -0.60253
t-value -0.5068 3.8931 -3.8375 0.5179 17.656 1.6162 3.279 0.2016
Note: LMO
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order autocorrelation 
LMA = Lagrange Multipliers test for Autocorrelation
LMN = Lagrange Multipliers test for Normality 1.9232
LMO = Lagrange Multipliers test for Homoskedasticity
Regression in the levels of the variables and residuals cointegration tests (PC industry)
Dep var. Sample Intercept MKT return trend S.E. of R. CRADF CRADF order 95% crit. val Res. DGP
IND return 1974-99 1.4021 0.11229 - 0.11609 -2.2162 0 -3.6421 I(1)
Note:
S.E. of R. = Standard Error of Regression
CRADF = Cointegration Rank Augmented Dickey-Fuller (critical values from McKinnon) 
CRADF order = number of lagged dep variables in the auxiliary regression selected on the base of AIC
Residual DGP = Data Generating Process for residuals
t-values, F-stats and R-bar statistics are not reported because spurious for the presence of all I(1) variables 
in the regressions in levels 
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End Notes 
                                                     
i Entries were calculated as the number of firms that were recorded as producers in the 
year indicated, but that were not recorded as producers in the previous year. Exits were 
calculated as the number of firms that were not recorded as producers in the year 
indicated, but that were recorded as producers in the previous year.  
 
ii The firms used by the S&P to create the automobile index are (dates in parentheses are 
the beginning and, if relevant, the end dates): Chrysler (12-18-25), Ford Motor (8-29-56), 
General Motors  (1-2-18), American Motors (5-5-54 to 8-5-87), Auburn Automobile (12-
31-25 to 5-4-38), Chandler-Cleveland (1-2-18 to 12-28-25), Hudson Motor Car (12-31-25 
to  4-28-54), Hupp Motor Car (1-2-18 to 1-17-40), Nash-Kelvinator Corp (12-31-25 to  4-
28-54), Packard Motor Car (1-7-20 to 9-29-54), Pierce-Arrow (1-2-18 to 12-28-25), Reo 
Motor Car (12-31-25 to 1-17-40), Studebaker Corp. (10-6-54 to 4-22-64), White Motor 
(1-2-18 to 11-2-32), and Willy’s Overland (1-2-18 to 3-29-33).  
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iii  To make sure that the different sources for the pre-war and post-war financial data 
were consistent, results in the post-war period were checked for their sensitivity to 
whether the aggregate industry data (provided by S&P) was used or whether the industry 
data that was averaged from the firm-level data was used.  The results proved robust to 
this check.  
 
iv The computer industry was first labelled by S&P as Computer Systems and then in 
1996 changed the name to Computer Hardware. Firms that are currently included in this 
index are: Apple Computer (4-11-84), COMPAQ Computer (2-4-88), Dell Computer (9-
5-96), Gateway, Inc. (4-24-98), Hewlett-Packard (6-4-95), IBM (1-12-19), Silicon 
Graphics (1-17-95), and Sun Microsystems (8-19-92).  Firms that were included in the 
past include: Digital Equipment Corp. (10-15-75 to 6-11-99), NCR Corp (12-31-25 to 9-
19-91), Pitney Bowes (8-3-55 to 10-7-87), Prime Computer (12-26-84 to 8-23-89), 
Unisys Corp (12-31-25 to 6-28-96), and Wang Lab. (8-27-80 to 8-19-92).  
 
v It should be noted that the larger total number of firms listed in the PC industry (more 
than 600 by IDC) than in the auto industry (about 350 in most case studies) is not due to 
structural differences between the two industries, but due to the more advanced data 
gathering methods that are available today.  These methods allow market researchers to 
trace the evolution of very small-sometimes insignificant- firms.  Nevertheless, some 
sources for the number of firms in the early auto industry, like Carroll and Hannan (2000) 
who count “pre-producers” as well, report a total count of firm numbers much larger than 
that found in the PC industry (up to 3,000!).  Given these differences, the emphasis of the 
paper is on the dynamics of firm numbers over time (increasing then decreasing), not on 
the actual number in any given year. 
 
vi In 2000, the leading market shares were: Compaq 13%, Dell 12%, IBM 8%, Hewlett-
Packard 7.3%, and Fujitsu-Siemans 5.1%. 
 
vii In a similar vein, Klepper and Simons (2000) describe how those firms in the television 
transmitter industry that had pre-existing competencies in the radio industry, were the 
ones that developed an early lead.  
 
viii The higher percentage of early failures in the PC industry than in the auto industry is 
due principally to the fact that more firms were included in the sample of PC firms, as 
explained in Section II and in endnote V.  
      
ix Although the index might be affected by the number of firms, it is empirically not very 
sensitive to it because small firms do not contribute greatly to the value of the index.  
This is because they account for such a small share of the industry and because they tend 
to grow no faster on average than large firms (Hymer and Pashigian,1962, p. 86).    
 
x “A price war is hitting PC makers hard. Many well-known names could disappear from 
the high street…But not all the problems are due to the downturn in the economy or the 
bursting of the Internet bubble. Much of the suffering has been caused by Dell computer 
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which started a price war to gain market share.” Trouble at the top for PC giants, The 
Guardian, September 13, 2001.  
 
xi “Personal computer shipments suffer first fall in 15 years”, The Financial Times, July 
21/22, 2001.  
 
xii The first step involves a regression in the levels of the variables: individual firm (and 
industry) stock returns are regressed on the S&P 500 stock return.  Unit root tests are then 
run on the residuals from this regression to test for cointegration. In the tables, if the 
CRADF critical values from Mackinnon are larger than the 95% critical value, then the 
residual is I(0), i.e. stationary and the two variables are cointegrated.   Furthermore, 
although with I(1) variables the standard error of the residuals (called S.E. of R in the 
tables) is not an exact measure, this standard error can be interpreted (lightly) as the firm-
specific and industry-specific degree of risk: the larger it is the more unsystematic risk 
there is. The second step involves the Granger Representation Theorem which states that 
a cointegrated relationship always admits a representation in terms of an Error Correction 
Model (ECM) with the variables in differences.  The coefficient on the lagged residual 
(called RES -1 in the tables) in this equation must be statistically meaningful and negative 
for the cointegration relationship to hold.  The strength of the long run relation is 
captured by the dimension of this parameter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
